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DTIODOCTIOll 
DOV DOU ECOtOaC caownt COlllLATI VITB STOCX Cl:OW't1lf 
Oftea la bualoeH artlclea the following r ... n •Y be Hent "If 
• company la not growtq, lt la retrogrHdag; for no bullneH -Y etaod 
etUl!" The eapclt7 of thia obHnatlon with regard to lndlridual enter-
pri-• cannot be atreHed too frequently nor too etroa1ly. Yet thi• 
trul- becc.ea .,,.ll .,,_.. •pproprlate •nd •ppareot tlbea •ppUed to a nation'• 
ec:oaomy. Altbouah thia paper dula priMrlly tritb ""'c• ... : _,ru 
call any part of a nation'• ~ .,.. independently of the total trend. 
Therefore, a f .. explanatory ~rb nprdiq the Ouited State• ecooocy 
•• a 1'bole an in orct.r. 
lftll a paHlna acquaintance with bJ.etory •b• cl .. r the concern 
1 
•a baa alwya bad wttb rahlna hh ataodard of UYiq. Ia hi• ugerneH 
and effona to locreaH the quantity (and quality) of the good• and Hrv-
of diatrlbutloa cbanoela through ..tucb a flood of eotlclag •~d labor• 
aaYiag gooda and Hrricea flan, propelled by the uanleatln1 pr•Hure of 
1Dftate4 dollara. A ftry eo11pllcated ecooomy bae deftloped, vith aich 
Tberefon, it la aeitlwtr aurpdalng nor iocoa.datent tbat the ... aura-
-ll.t and prognoatlcatioa of the direction, •gnitude, aad gTOVth of the 
l" Standard of Li Ying," losxcJopaodla ldtarmf.ca, II (1961), P• 308. 
the subject of standard of llria.g h iatereatingly dbcuaaed here. It h 
defined •• a co11nnint wy of upnHlng the ltind aad quantity of gooda 
and Hnicea oa.a tndhidual (gTOUp or nation) enjoy• relathe to tho•• 
enjoyed by another (group or aa tioa) • 
vi 
1 United States economy baa received the attention and concern of so many. 
It should be pointed out that this concern is universal due to the stake 
the whole world bas in the success or failure of the United States. 
Either to dwell on t~e foi:midable array of atati1tical indicators 
2 that are used to measure the progress of the United Statea economy. or 
to review extensively the many forecasts made for the future of the 
economy, 3 would be digression for this thesis. However, the investor must 
not interpret tbia statement as a dismissal of these areas as unimportant 
onea. It is imperative that he be aware of cyclical variations in the 
economy's past and with the nature of the current trend of business. In 
addition, he 111.1at be cognizant of the areas of activity that are considered 
4 
siguifieant indicators and with forecasters' predictiona for their future. 
For any general growth comparisons made ln this paper, the gross national 
product alone vill be cited since. "it is probably the most widely used 
1 This question is paramount in the minds of most leaders and cap .. 
taina of industry in the United States. One of the moat complete and 
informative studies in the area was just completed by the Commission on 
Money and Credit '. The report ia available in book form under the title, 
Money ~ Credit, from McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.; "Setting Growth 
Goals," Business Weels (November 18, 1961), p. 34. 
Zro somewhat comprehend the extent to which the economy is measured. 
one baa only ~o pick up a copy of the monthly publication of the Depart• 
ment of Conmerce, entitled, Survey g! Current Buainesa. 
3A compendium of these review may be secured from the Federal 
lleaerve Bank. under the title of lluainesa Forecasts (1962). 
4rrequently, indicators. are broken down for forecasting purposes 
into three groupa: "leaders, laggera, and coincidera." An interesting 
article on this subject appeared in the Management Review (April, 1959), 
p. 19; .:!'.!!!..American Institute 2£ Economic Research, Great Barrington, 
Masaacbusetta, also baa many articles. on this subject. 
vii 
meaeure of total economic activity (growth) and is the statistic which 
moat business analyets use to express their predictiona for the businesa. 
cycle.111 There appears to be general agreement among business forecasters 
that the growth which the United States economy bas experienced in the 
past should continue into the indefinite future' (Some even see an ac-
celerating rate due to the all•significant population explosion.)2 
Therefore, an investor may well be curious about obtaining a means 
for imitating this historic growth pattern, especially in light of the 
forecasts for the future. It is reasonable to expect many United ·States 
corporations to share generously in this future econamic growth,. otbers 
only moderately ·or not at all. It is almost a certainty that investors 
\lhose portfolios contain stocks of corporationa which will most bountifully 
participate in this growth, will enjoy proportionate returns on their 
investment•• The real problem for the investor and the crux of this 
paper lies in discovering hov to identify these growth companies' securities 
and in ·deciding bow much can be reasonably paid for their growth prospects. 
At this point• though, the investor is probably questioning bis 
ability to be able to buy ·theee securities in the future. Be sees that 
the economy is rising, but rightly asks whether hie income will also rise. 
The most often quoted statistic for measuring the income of John Q. Public 
ia personal income••constructed and presented from data gathered by the 
l • . 
. Federal Reserve Bank. !!!!., Monthly Review (February, 1962), pp. 6-7. 
An excellent article on the composition and significance of the gross 
national product from which this sentence is quoted. 
. 2uenry Steel Comnager, "The Enormous Increase in Population in the 
United .States and in the World•" A Report Prepared for the Committee for 
Economic Development (January, 1958), ·p. 345. 
v111 
1 United States Department of Conmerce. Personal income bas risen from 
an annual rate of approxitn..tely $275 billion in 1954 to an annual rate 
of approximately $425 billion in 1961. There is no reason to believe that 
this upward trend will falter in the near future. vitb the continued pres• 
sure of labor unions, coupled with the demands for more highly skilled 
workers (and consequently more highly paid) from an expanding industrial 
fabric. Jtven more significant, for the purposes of this paper, than the 
amount of money that wage earners receive; is the amount that they do not 
i1111J1ediately spend. 
. 2 
Thia amount is represented by the savings element. 
The rise in savings from approximately $18 billion in 1954 to approximately 
$28 billion in 1961, indicates: (1) that people aTe able to achieve a 
satisfying standard of living from their incomes and still have excess 
funds, and (2) that there is a potential power which may be routed to 
goods and services or channeled into investments. If the wage earner 
continues in this savings bend, he should become a'.rnre of bow best to 
make these savings 1110rk moat effectively for him. 
. A logical question now is whether wage earners currently are select-
ing common stocks for saved earnings. The New York Stock Exchange conducted 
the moat recent study in this area, using transactions which occurred on 
3 that exchange during one day. This study showed that institutional in-
vestors (banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, etc.) continued to grow 
1rederal Reserve Bank, Federal Reserve Chart Book (196», P• 52; 
Survey 2f Current Eusiness (December, 1961), p. 12; Federal Reserve Bank, 
Monthly Review (November, 1961), p. 5. 
~ederal Reserve Bank, Federal Reserve Chart Bo~k (1961), p. 46. 
3New York Stock Exchange, Eleventh Public Transaction Study 
(September 13, 1961). 
in importance. Their proportion of total .sales purchased was 22.6 percent 
(1,936,000 shares) compared with 24.3 percent (733,745 shares) in September, 
1960, and 24.6 percent (329,190 ahares) in September, 1952. Public indi-
viduals accounted for 51 .• 4 percent (1, 557, 125 shares) which is substantially 
the same percentage as in years past: 52.6 percent (1,467,990) in 1960, 
and ~7 ·percent (649,397 ehares) in 1952. The real importance of these 
statistics. Hes in the increases in the number of sh.area traded, and tbe 
increased number of individual shareholders represented. The last census 
1 . . 
of shareholders was made in 1959, at which time 12,490,000 individuals 
owned shares in publicly held corporations. The Brookings Institute made 
a similar study in 19562 at which time 8,630,000 individuals held shares. 
The current (January, 1962) estimate is 15,000,000. 
Several significant conclusions may be drawn from close study of 
these statistics. The increased purchases of common stocks by institu-
tlonal investor& attests to the fact that coamon stocks have gained 
investment stature. Institutional portfolio managers realize that conmon 
stocks have a large part to play in maximizing investment returns, while 
still maintaining an acceptable level of riska. 3 The above quoted figures 
also appear to indicate that an increased number of private investors have 
decided that common stocks of fer one of the best routes for achieving their 
investment goals. 
1
"Sbareownership in America," New York Stock Exchange (1959). 
2 George Leffler, Stock Market. Ronald Presa Company (1959). 
3"Fund Managers Break Rank," Business ~ (February 17, 1962), 
p· 110. Although there is agTeement in principle, quite naturally there 
are differences in the extent. 
In light of the foregoing, the incentive, the funds, and the 
precedent all seem to be facing the discretionary income-holding investor 
with the question! '"Whnt is the nature of gTowth stocks?" Can he select 
a security that will equal or better the future growth rate of the United 
States economy and that wf.11 grant him an estimable and adequate return? 
This paper will not offer recounendations for particular issues. 
Growth stocks will be examined only to detendne if a form of value 
analysi~ can be performed to reduce the stock's future growth prospects 
to an objective and tangible concept. This will be done for the benefit 
of the investor who decides that growth stocks are tha means which will 
best achieve his investment goal. 
WHAT IS THE PLAN OF THIS PAPER? 
Certain sound investment principles concerning personal finances 
and investment portfolio management will be assumed a• inmutable; for 
example: (1) all investors must p?'O\..j,de adequately for family needs, and 
segregate (-unda for the market place as truly discretionary income; 
(2) the investor should know within rough limits the nature (if not the 
percentage) of the return he desires from his portfolio; (3) he should 
desire to practice diversification of holdings in his portfolio; and 
(4) he must wish to move into the market only after thoroughly investi-
gating the potential and risks surrounding a market opportunity. 
Thia discussion must not be construed to be a disparagement of more 
conservative approaches to investment. Investors' goals, needs. and at-
tendant financial resources must be matched and will often dictate a 
xi 
reserved investment policy; e.g., the widow who needs imnediate and 
current income. Usually, limited resources preclude growth stocks from 
these portfolios, since by their nature growth has to occur before t111c~ 
"harvest"· can be reaped. Also, as will be seen, greater risks to prin-
cipal are generally incurred in dealing in growth stocks. Growth stocks 
are being recognized merely as a current force, and consideration of their 
merit is given for investors whose goals are in harmony with the character 
of such investments. 
After further documenting growth stocks and their attractiveness 
in Cb.apter One, definition of growth is offered in Chapter Tvo. Indica-
tions of growth are reviewed and examined there also, as they might appear 
in a corporation's profile. Chapter Three is concerned with discussing 
methods for ferreting out the rie~a inherent in the growth corporations 
and their stock issues. Then, the subjective task of balancing the risks 
observed against the return potential seen is undertaken. Chapter Four 
is concerned with reducing this balancing process to a mathematical 
exercise that will make the process more objective. The final chapter will 
be a summary of the preceding four and an attempt to streaa tlte dangers 
inherent when human judgment determines whether or not money will be made. 
CHAPTER ONE 
IS GROWTB REALLY A FACTOR IN STOCltS1 
When one thumbs through nearly any business periodical, be is likely 
to run across an at:ticle discussing coaaon stocks or the stock market. Some 
of these articles discuss technical aspects of the market; some describe 
market mechanics; currently, some revolve around a phase of the Securities 
Exchange Commission investigation; and many will probably be concerned with 
tho question of bow one decides which stocks offer the best profit potential 
for investment in the near future. Frequently. an article concerns itself 
specifically with growth stocks. 1 This interest in stocks. plus their re-
lationship with the growing economy noted in the introduction. justifies a 
further examination of growth in stocks. 
The majority of investors define growth for a particular stock in 
terms of market price increases. For this reason, many services attempt 
to chart the growth of the stock market as gauged by market price aggregates. 
2 These figures are statistically adjusted aggregates of some 33 to 425 issues, 
depending upon the particular service observed. Some of these services and 
1Lelean B. Drake, "Are Analysts Techniques Adequate for Growth Stocks?" 
Financial Analysts .Journal (November-December, 1960), p. 45; "Those Delicious 
Growth Stocka, 11 Fortune (April. 1959), p. 32. 
2rh1a allusion highlights an area which is not central to this paper. 
but should be noted. Much criticism and praise surrounds these measures. 
The Dov-Jones Industrial Average ia probably the moat widely known and 
frequently cited. Standard and Poore 425 and the.!!!!!~ Times averages 
are also well known. Two extensive articles concerning one average (pro and 
con) may be found in The Pinancial Analysts Journal, (March•Aprll. 1961). 
They are written by cb,;;1ea J. Collins, uThe Dow-Jones Industrial Average," 
and Nicholas Molodovosky, "Dow-Jones lnduatriala: a Reappraisal." 
2 
their charts are familiar to even the cursory reader of business articles 
or of the financial pages of almost any daily newspaper. A glance at any 
one of these services reveals the general growth of stock market prices 
since World War II. J!ut, how may an investor see this growth stated in 
clearer and more familiar categories? 
A recent issue of the!!· !· ~ !..W! World Report included a per-
tinent article entitled, "What Investors Need to Enow."1 In the article 
was a chart showing the performance of stock prices, by industries, in 1961. 
This chart directed the investor's attention to the issues which, as meas-
ured by market prices, have grown most rapidly. It is an excellent example 
of a tool which an investor might use in bis efforts to delimit stocks 
through the use of categories into a manageable number of candidates for 
investment conaideration.2 
Yet, when the stocks of an industry as a whole have enjoyed growth 
at a certain rate, the growth of market prices for the stocks of selected 
companies within the industry have not necessarily grown at the same rate. 
Examples of this condition abound. A familiar one for 1961 is Inter• 
national Business Machines. l3usiness machines as an industry bad 47.7 
percent rise in market price, but International Business Machines' market 
price rose only 35.8 percent. (Low of $447; high of $607) Consequently, 
1u. !.· Hews !!!!! World Report (January 3, 1962), p. 53. 
2 Another example of important point-categorizing which facilitates 
investment opportunity appraisal appears in the !!· !· ~ !.!!!!, World 
Report (August 21, 1961). This chart shows in percentage, by industrial 
classes, stocks whose market prices were still below earlier peaks. 
3 
although a certain industry may enjoy growth in general• an investor will 
not necessarily reap a proportional harvest. His investment must have real 
growth, be attractive to other investors (offering liquidity), and, l30St 
important, must be bought at a reasonable price. A real problem lies in 
selecting such stocks which will growlDD&t rapidly before their growth is 
over-discounted in their market price.a by demanda of other investors. 
The investor should observe that although growth comes in many sizes--
slow, moderate, spectacular, or even no growth1--thia quality exists, and 
.its inherent profit potential almost magnetically attracts study for better 
definition of its nature. 
WY IS CB.OVrH ALLURING TODAY? 
It is somewhat axiomatic to the field of investments to say that 
the only two ways in which gain may be realized from an investment are 
through current income (i.e., rent, dividends, interest, etc.) or through 
appreciation of the market price, often called capital appreciation. Many 
good investment opportunities allow the owner to realize bis profit from 
both sources; however, one or the other is generally selected at the outset 
to furnish the primary source of profit. In the field of securities, cur-
rent income would be in the form of dividends from stocks or interest from 
bonds. A rise in the security's market price would give capital appreciation, 
if sold. 
1The sales and/or profits of some companies remain almost static 
throughout a year, and therefore, qualify as no gTOWt:h eituationa. This 
point is discussed in an article by Jlurton Crane, entitled, ''Value of 
Growth in Stock Weighted," which appeared in New York Times (April 10 
1960). - - , 
4 
1 In recent years, the yields on conmon stocks have been very low. 
For the last quarter of a century~ yields in the Dow-Jones industrial 
gl'OUping have not dipped belov 3 percent (except for a very brief period 
in mid-1959 and again the sunmer of 1961). Yet it should be noted that 
yields were 6.48 percent in 1950, and that they have fallen ·eacb year since 
then••to·a 1961 low of 3.03 percent. In light of these figures. it appears 
that invenors are not presently looking to cu'Uellt income from .their 
stocks for their investment return to the degree that they bad previously~ 
Another fact from the study by the New York Stock Exchange (noted in 
Introduction) appears pertinent at this point.2 The September 13. 1960, 
study showed that 62 percent of the shares bought by the public individuals 
were for long-tem investment. This compares with 60 .8 percent in 1961 
and 55.6 percent in 1955. In light of coumon stock's cuXTent yields, 
these holding-period figures lend evidence to the argument that investors 
are looking more to capital appreciation than to dividends for their 
return.3 
From the foregoing observations, the logical question would be: 
why, as evidenced by the increased stock sales, are many investors 
i .. Dividend Yields on Stocks Near Lov of 30' e as Market llisee to 
Another Hew High," !!!!! Street Journal (December 14, 1961), P• 3. 
2
"Eleventh Public Transaction Study, .. (September 13, 1961), con-
ducted by the Nev York Stoclc Exchange. 
3 In truth, this is not t:he only conclusion that may be drawn from 
these figures, since investors vbo are holding stocks solely for income 
would be included in this group also. but in light of low current yields, 
the conclusion is sound. 
apparently looking eagerly· toward future growth·and capital.appreciation 
for their investment returns'l Several conditions exist today .that make 
investors who do not neec:t current income for . living expetiaes willing to 
look to the. future. 
s 
rhe corporat;ions, especially industrial giants, ·have come of age and 
respectability in the eyes of the average investor. With the additional 
strength .of the government's watchful and regulatory eye over business' 
shoulder, serious fraud . is minimized. The increased stature.of corporate 
securities was mentioned in the .introduction of .this paper, . but the fact 
plays such .an important role in this story that it merits this sentence of 
repetition .. 
The personal .income tax• currently .at almost onerous rates, takes 
such sizable chunks from an indlVidual'a current income that the deferring 
of income to another taxable year vill .have beneficial results in most 
instances. This is especially true with the favorable capital-gains treat-
1 
ment provided by the Internal Revenue Code. It is noteworthy that the 
aix•montb holding period necessary to qualify income for capital gains 
treatment ties in reasonably with the holding-period intentions of investors 
for securities noted by the New York Stock Exchange study. 
Inflation~ the insidious enemy of the dollar's purchasing power. is 
still another factor that bas made investors find capital appreciation the 
most enticing form of return on invested funds. No attempt to discuss it 
fully will· be made here; but the catastrophic effect that it bas bad on the 
119ternal Revenue ~. Section 1201. 
6 
purchasin.g power of the dollar is a matter of record. Inflation bas moti• 
vated many investors to protect the current purchasing power of their saved 
dollars by tnvesting ln securities that promise future capital appreciation. 
Every investor baa this formidable problem of protecting the purchasing power 
of bis earned dollars. He must recognize the danger• of inflation and o}>. 
serve bow capital gains might aid in solving his dilemma. 
Because of these significant reasons . for considering capital appre• 
elation _as the bulk of return on any investment, growth stockA a~e now the 
real elements in the investment world. There is also evidence that more 
investors are taking this route to investment return. Because of this, a 
study of grovtb stocks to discern true value will be helpful in this quest 
for capital appreciation on invested funds. 
CHAP'l'E& 'NO 
WHAT IS GROWTH? 
In the first chapter it vas stated that growth, aa measured by 
market price increases, bas occurred at various rates throughout the stock 
market listing in recent years. It vaa also noted that many investors 
apparently are buying atocks that offer future growth prospects in the 
hope of obtaining investment return in the fotm of future capital 
appreciation. 
To this point, no complete definition bas been given for the cause 
(growth) of these effects. When one speaks of a stock as a growth stock, 
if he will analyze what he le envisioning (beyon~ the market price), he 
will perceive· that be baa really decided that this stock's market price 
will appreciate in the future due to growth factors that are intrinsic 
to the stock. He believes that when these factors come to fruition, other 
investors will bid up the price for the privilege of owning a share of this 
stock! For these reasons, before any further discussion of growth stocks 
can be engaged in, growth must be examined for a definition. 
In 1960, l!usinees !!!!!s, carried an article concerned with growth in 
a general sense; it likened growth for an economy unto the development 
of the physical stature of a child into the body of an adult.1 The thrust 
of this article t.1188 that many unseen processes are working diligently and 
untiringly .to evoke only a gradual outward evidence of growth. This is 
somewhat like the real growth prospects an investor ahould seek. 
1
"TheUnited States Invents a New Way to Grow," Business~ 
(January 23, 1960), p. 52. 
8 
Before examining this matter more closely, it will be beneficial 
to cite a few growth patterns that .JllUst not be confused with~ growth. 
Spurious growth (for this thesis) .would be growth of market prices brought 
about by making a bargain purchase, or through a properly-timed purchase. 
Examples of these types of purchases abound, but not as of ten as "tips on 
the street" would lead prospective investors to believe. For instance. 
occasionally a company's stock may be selling at a market price below the 
per-share value of its assets. Thia bargain-purchase situation may be 
bought with hopes that other investors will .notice this situation and 
subsequently, through the effects of demand, bid up the market price. 
Or, possibly, the investor feels that the unglamorous aitµation that ap-
parently (judged by the market price) besets the company will soon be 
corrected. 1 He may buy the stock due to these convictions, or be may even 
buy the stock at this depressed price in expectation of realizing a profit 
through liquidation. Also included in this category of bargain hunting 
would be "PUrchaslna stock to make a profit on the market impact that the 
announcement of certain corporate news will bave.2 
This does not mean that all of these and similar market positions 
are not advantageous, .and even desirable, for an investor; but, the point 
is that these positions ought to be "in addition to's" for stocks that 
have sound basic growth potentials, or value. This basic value is of 
lSome market pundits consider Chrysler Corporation a possible 
current candidate for this situation since the "shake-up" in top manage-
ment appears completed. 
2Revlon, Inc. was an example of a stoclt that vas affected this 
way; with the announcement of "Eterna" (face cream) the market price went 
from $61 to $85 in a matter of weeks. 
primal importance becauee the lnvestor will have nothlng with which to 
"bail himself out," and he may well auffer a heavy loss if the market price 
sltuation that makes a stock a bargain purchase does not materialize and 
there is no baslc gmwth value ln the situation. 
Therefore, the growth potential to be sought will come from the 
adroit appllcatiou of labor and materials by skillful, capable, and 
imaginative management, and be manifested by ever-increasing corporate 
eorninga. Merely increased salea·-witbout the maintenance of profit 
margins--will not give increased earnings! Quite often, lncreaaed sales 
figures are pointed to as prima-facle proof that a company 18 gNving and 
la a desirable inveataient opportunity--this juat ia not so!1 
ROW CAN GllOWt1l BE ID!NTIFIED'l 
This question atilt faces the lnveator: hov can the stock of a 
company that has these desirable growth qualities be diecerned'l In 
answering this question, an investor would be veil adviaed, firat, to 
glance at the gTOaa national product and observe areas that are sharing 
greatly in this $SSS billion annual spending apree. It will be observed 
by glancing at a breakdown of the gross national product that non-durables, 
especially services, are receiving an ever-increasing number of dollars 
from the public. Couumer expenditures represent the largest part of 
the gross national product, accounting for approximately two-thirds of the 
total in recent years. Secondly. the investor ehould recognize that 
l 11A fresh Look at the Jole of Profits in Company Growth," ~11neaa 
Week (February 27, 1960), p. 94. 
10 
stocks thesnaelves can be divided into three helpful categories: (1) ones 
which relate ~o money rates, (2) ones of companies with cyclical sales 
patterns, and (3) growth stocks. These variations must be kept in mind 
when brooding over risks inherent in stock evaluations. These divisions 
exist, and .an investor must not lose sight of these forms while studying 
their shadows, the individual companies. The value· of having broad ideas 
regarding industrial stock interests and the rates at which money is being 
funneled thereto, lies in aiding estimates of what the future may hold for 
a certain industry or company. 
With these general thoughts in mind, an investor must now decide 
what areas to examine behind the stock in the company which be feels might 
have growth prospects. In examining the influences that must be considered 
before drawing conclusions regarding a company's growth prospects, it will 
be helpful to divide these influences, somewhat arbitrarily, into external 
and internal ones~ 
The importance of management is not included in either the external 
or internal category. At first blush, management might appear to be strictly 
an internal influence. Upon examination. however, it will be noted that 
the caliber of management to be sought must make decisions conscious of 
and within the matrix of both areas, and perceive how each influence will 
affect the total corporate strategy. The quallty of its management is 
the moat important single element in any company. It is also the most 
difficult to evaluate. Management must skillfully direct the utilization 
of the company's assets of capital, labor, and tools for profits to be 
realized. Maximum earnings can accrue only through the optimum utilization 
11 
of theae aaaeta.l Skillful, coat-conscious, and imaginative management 
~an compensate for marginal assets, but seldom can a sunlus of fixed assets 
offset marginal or weak management. 
Ezternal influences are those elements in and through which a cor-
poration 11111at operate and distribute its product and which, therefore, 
bear upon the earning potential of the corporation. Only by reasonable 
and thorough analysis of these, 88 well 88 internal influences, will an 
investor be in a position to decide intelligently how a particular cor-
poration will tare, relative to competitive investment opportunities. 
External considerationa to be observed and weighed will vary widely from 
industry to industry, from geographic location to geographic location, 
and from company to company. The most .important external influences 
revolve around the general economic outlook referred to in the introduction. 
An understanding of economic forecasts and statistical measures is funda-
mental to any sound stock decisions. Integral with this, and equally as 
fundamental, is a general grasp of governmental intentions (especially 
federal) with regard to expenditures and business legislation (tax, import, 
export, duty, labor,. com:nerce, etc.). 
Once familiar with these general influences, the investor should 
turn bis attention to the particular stocks which he wishes to study and 
then, one by one, atudy them more closely. State and local governmental 
influences on the particular induatry or company under study will still 
1Aa expenses mount> putting more of a squeeze on profit margins, 
management is becoming'more concerned with more accurately determining 
this point. An expansion of this point may be found in "Re tum on 
Investment Concept and Corporate Policy, n National Association of 
Accountants Bulletin, L. Millard Gelvin, July> 1961. 
12 
be in the category of external influence1. . These v:l.11 be more 1ignificant 
if the indu1try ia a regulated business; i.e., a utility or a financial 
inati tu ti on •. 
Laet, but not least in thi• external grouping are general indus-
trial influencea.. Some of these v:lll be liated, but not commented upon 
extensively:. 
A. la competition aggressive, intenae and plentiful? 
B. Doe1 industry live on governmental and/or defenae contracts? 
C. la the industry generally regarded aa glamorous (_electronics) 
or aick (railroada)? 
D. Are earning• customarily plowed back into research and de-
velopment and therefore bidden by accounting entries? Thia 
ia critical because plowed-back earuinga, if vell used, tend 
to maintain growth into perpetuity. 
E. Are coa.umer-acceptable subatitutea, which v:lll drastically 
affect the industry in the future, entering the market? 
Consideration of these que1tioa. is essential for grasping the scope 
of external influences that will buffet the corporation being examined. 
The internal influences are numerous and more individualistic for 
each company and, therefore, require more reaearch for adequate answers 
than do external influencea. The extent of thla examination vUl be Uaited 
by the availability of infoniuttion, the ability of the investigator, and 
the time available for investigation. The objective here ia to discern 
the major trends and pick out any particularly exciting onea. The extent 
and depth of analysia applied to ~ch 1ituation i1 •• critical a judgi:aent 
for the investor as eny other since all prospect• v:lll be relative to the 
security'• market price, and this probably meana daily danger-- .. Tiae ii 110ney!" 
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Again, a fev important areas to observe vill be mentioned, but not 
extensively commented upon: 
A. What has the history of earnings been? What ia their cut"rent 
trend? Does the future appear rosy? Ia the arose and net 
profit margin holding up, increasing, or decreasing? 
B. What appears to be the future salea return? The sales history 
must be viewed and then projected into the future. If the 
company (or industry) la plagued by a seaaonal pattern, the 
secular trend must be diacerned. 1 (Only the secular trend is 
concrete enough for prognostications.) 
C. From the sales study, it must be discovered which product (or 
aubsidiary company) is profltable and which 1a not. If the 
future of the company hangs on one product, and that product 
accounts for only a small part of the total ealea, the future 
of the total company, especially its stock, would be doubtful. 
I>. Cash flow baa been emphasized in recent years aa a significant 
guide to the value of an investment.2 The investor should com-
pute this amount and observe how many times said amount the 
market price asks him to pay. The investor here 1a paying 
cash for cash! 
1secular trend is a familiar statistical concept which simply meana 
the real trend, either upward or downward, after adjustment• are made for 
seasonal and cyclical factors. It is important to observe this trend be-
cause an investor clearly can afford to pay more for sure secular growth 
than he can for merely transitory, seasonal, or cyclical growth. 
2
"Cash Plov is the Nev Pad, 0 Business Week (November 4, 1961), 
p. 135. 
14 
!.. What la the future, in general, for the company'• .. jor 
p~uct1? The anner to thla queatlon muat be gauged by coo-
aumer wbima, aocial .,rea, and aocial trenda. the clHaic•l 
ecoaoad.c aample of the fate of the borae•a collar vttb the 
advent of the automobile pointa up the dab here. 
P. %he company'• annual profit and loaa figure• abould be atudied 
cloaely to determine if there are any non-recurring profit• or 
loa1ea included in tbeae flgurea. Such it111119 aigbt be inauranco 
ca1ualty loa1 payment• or tax a1ee1ament. !'be1e could badly 
deba1a any profit project1otl9. 
G. Bow do the balance abeet and operating 1tateme11t1 1tadc up 
agal111t those of the indu1try?l 
B. Doe1 the company have a atrong patent podtionf (Polaroid2 
ii an excellent example.) What are the future rilkl here? 
I. Uov 111Ucb reacarch aad development ba1 been aod ii being carriod 
on? Bov productive ba1 it been? 
J. Dov difficult ia it for a.ev coapaniea to enter the competitive 
field? (e.g., the 1teel indu1try, aut01110bile1) 
It. Does the company appear to be geographic.Uy loclted in fro11 
its markets? Are the market• atable, falling, or increa1ing? 
All of tbe1e quest10D8 and mny mre mu1t be thoughtfully anavored 
in order to reach aound judgment decision.a regarding the grovtb po11i-
bilitiea of a particular company. 
1statiatical comparieona are available from aucb aervicea •• the 
Robert Morrie Aaeociatee (National Asaociation of Bank J.oao Offlcera and 
Credit Ken, Philadelphia, PeD.D.l}'lvania) in their publication, "1960 
Statement Studtea." 
2"The Magic That Made Polaroid," Forcune (April, 1959), P· 125. 
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At this juncture, the investor should have some firm and maybe 
even glamorous notions regarding. the growth and profit potential of the 
stocks in several companies. Be probably recognizes that the projections 
he has made for the company's earning power. probable dividend policy, and 
market price rises for the stock are all human decisions. But, he feels 
convinced that his analysis baa been thorough and that growth will occur ~ 
lu order to decide definitely bow much be may intelligently pay 
for these prospects~ he must compress all of these factors into an estimate 
of the future earnings of the company, expressed in dollars per share. 
In thinking about this task, the investor will undoubtedly begin to think 
about the fact that, so far, no really negative aspects to this investment 
opportunity have been mentioned. Where are the rialce that frequently 
are attributed to the practice of investing? These elements are the 
consideration of Chapter Three. 
CHAPTEI. THllEE 
HOW IS Rlste IDENTIFIED AND MEASURED? 
lo coneldering the riek• encrusting a particular aecurlty offering, 
an iuveator •hould utllize rather arbitrarily contri ved categorle• to 
organise hia thought•. A8 a l\lggeatlou, tvo broad. but interdependent 
divisions or riaka vill be eubaaitted: (1) market aad (2) bualD•••· 
Market ri•k• refer to tboae in and around the stock market b.aaar 
itself . One area of ri•k, alluded to earlier, liee ln the effects created 
by the large number• of •hare• that are bougllt and held by inatitutional 
inveatora. lnatitutional iuveatora, especially mutual funda, have large 
quantities of money to inveat from the funds of tbeir depoaitors aDd/or 
participants . Theee funda must be procrptly and regularly invested in order 
to cociply vith the fuod'e statutory obligation• SDd co earn tbo money needed 
to pay divi dend• and expenau. Therefore, when these inatitutlonal in-
veatora culminate atudiea into a market move, a ai&able our:aber of abarea 
are either bought or aold, and frequently the Lmpact ia great enough to 
create market price fluctuations in these particular iaeuea. The ai&e of 
institutional holdings haa definitely bad aa effect on 111.trket prlcea, clue 
to limiting the oumber of floating •hare• of certain atocka. 
Thia drying up of •u?ply. eapecially as dei:umd baa increaaed, ha• 
affected atock. market pricea true to the axic.:aatlc priocipl•• of aupply 
and demand. Tbis aupply end c!=and aituation h•• been cocpounded by cor-
porate reluctance in the introduction of aev equity iasuea , 1 again, vbile 
Lrbie reluctance baa been clue to the favorable ta treatment of 
intereat payuients, •• opposed to divldenda vbich have to came frOlll after-
tu earuioga. 
17 
demand bae increased. One effect of these situations baa been the tendency 
to create a generally higher level in all atock market prices. This supply 
shrinkage and attendant general price rise is clearly a risk and could 
become even more so tn the future, as these forces continue virile and 
volatile. 
A second formidable risk of the market place will be called stock 
fashions. These movements develop centrifugally from a discovery by cer-
tain stock market . analysts, causing groups of investors to decide that a 
certain {ndustry'.s, or company•s, stocks are particularly valuable because 
of their growth potentials relative to their current market prices. This 
condition may be due to a multiplicity of causes, such as the discovery 
of a new process (e.g~ , Technicolor Corporation in 1939 or Polaroid in 
the late 1940's and early 1950's), defense and corporate spending patterns 
(e.g., electronics in general; International Business Machines in par-
ticular, in the 1950's and 1960's), or merely the rediscovery of plodding, 
but sure growth (e.g., utility and bank stocks in the 1950's and 1960's). 
The risks inherent when a stock becomes glamorous lie in paying 
too dearly for the envisioned growth. The fickle stockbuying public may 
become disenchanted with this industry quickly, and if the stock does not 
have recuperative powers through strong .I!!! growthj, the bolder of the 
security will suffer loss. 
A third market risk of which investors should be cognizant is the 
limited marketability of certain issues. In all the foregoing discussion 
regarding growth of market prices for stocks and potential profit possi-
bilities, it has been implicit that the investor would have a reedy sale 
when he decided that his profit was satisfactory or when he needed the 
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invested funds for other purposes~ If the stocks in question are traded 
on a major exchange (New York Stock Exchange, American, etc.), a ready 
buyer, providing the desired liquidity, is virtually always available, 
But, if the ~hares are in a closely-held corporation,1 sale problems can 
be manifold~ Investors must consider thi& with every purchase .. 
Thete are many other risks involved in the market place, especially 
with regard to specific and specialized trading techniques; but, the points 
mentioned appear to be the major market considerations with which any 
investor should be thoroughly familiar and for which he should be watchful. 
Before a particular market move is made, an investor should observe his 
choice -carefully to discern if specialized market risks are peculiar to 
this investment~ 
Business risks, as here broadly defined, are the mirror images of 
any or all of the favorable trends and qualities which first attracted 
the investor to the particular corporatiotls stock. These were noted in 
Chapter Two; therefore, there need be no lengthy itemization of these 
trends (either external or internal) or reiteration of the obvious fact 
that the ri.sks lie in these trends reversing their positive patterua. 
But, a few statements regarding the extremely important quality of manage-
ment will aid in clearing this point of risk. This will point out that 
all business risks are inversely proportional to the ability of the com-
pany's management. Management should imnediately observe all reversals 
lsee the American Appraisal Corporation's booklet entitled, "Valu-
ation of Closely Held Corporate Stocks," by David Glunt. Frequently, 
losses are suffered due to "thin-market" situations (where an investor 
holds a few shares of stock in a closely-held corporation whlcb has a 
small number of outstanding shares). If a major holder dumps bis shares 
on the market, the few investors who might seek shares will be quickly 
satisfied. This will cause demand to drop and correspondingly wreck the 
market prices, creating a loss for the small shareholders. 
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and new problems. If management is really perceptive and robust enough 
to make corporate earnings dramatically grow, these changes will be com-
pensated for through iulDediate and direct action. The answer to the 
question of why some companies fail and others do riot must be laid at the 
feet of the company's management. When an investor is scrutinizing a 
corporation behind any security. he must note carefully all phases aa 
indicators of management's foresight, ability and attitude (or lack 
thereof). For instance. a corporation's dividend policy or ita capitaliza• 
tion (leverage) policy will give, some insight to the attitude management 
holds toward stockholders. This attitude is critical because the investor 
will quickly pass the stock of the company by ·if he observes historic. 
unrealistic payouts of earnings by the company as dividends; and/or .foresees 
little c()rporate expansion, earnings growth, or other factors to induce 
future growth. (Later reference will be made to this point.) If enough. 
investors assUDe that management does not have foresight· or concern for 
stockholders, and they do not hold or buy--the stock's market price will 
fall out of bed-·collspse! 
Therefore, when an investor examines a corporation in order to decide 
ita future and the future for its stock, he must carefully study charac-
teristics to discern risks. Then he must mentally sum all risks. It may · 
be apparent at this stage that the risk in the situation far outweighs 
the gcowth potential; in which case, the investor should abandon any further 
investigation. This decision frequently can be made easily because the 
investor knows roughly what retum he desires on his portfolio, and the 
risks may be so formidable that be. could not realize his desires. Yet, 
in many other cases, the risks are not so great and further investigation 
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is warranted. The investor must not forget bis mental appraisal of these 
riske, though, because they do form the basis for deciding what return 
he must demand :ln order to justify the assumption of these risks. 
HOW ARE GROWl'lt POTENTIALS AND RISKS BALANCED? 
At this point. the investor is bound to be dizzy with value judg-
ments and probably feels less confident than when he started this examination 
that stock investment is the route for him. This points out the real agony 
of stock market analyais--personal value judpents; it· is also, paradoxi~ 
cally, why the field is intriguing to so many. However, if the investment· 
opportunity appears to warrant further investigation, the next step is the 
key value judgment. Thia forces the investor to crystallize objectively 
~ind realis.tically the value of any qualifying growth stock into a somewhat 
pragmatic form. This step will be called the act' of balancing risks and 
growth potentials.· 
Pirst, emphasis must be made of an element that· bas been, and always 
vill be, basic to any investment decision. Thia key element, inescapable 
in every judgment that an investor must make and, generally, the critical 
question, is an estimate .of time·-"when?" F.mphasia of this point was 
reserved purposefully for this section because, to balance growth and risk 
value judgments, a decision regarding "when" will have to be made with 
regard to each. The investor will quickly discover that answering when 
accurately is equally as difficult a decision to make as which stock. 
Involved here is deciding how long the growth prospects will take to bear 
fruit, and, therefore, when to buy- tha stock, when to. hold, and when to 
sell. It should be obvious how critical these decisions are to successful 
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investment activities! The· question of .time does not pose any problem if 
it is obvious that the riaka against .real gTOWtb are .so great that ·the 
return prospects do not "justify the purchase. Once lt ia decided that fur-
th,er investigation is justified, time becomes critical.. ·Therefore, the 
1nve,stor must recognize tha~ he is constantly racing the::clock in making 
his decisions. Other investors are not waiting; conditions are constantly 
changing., as ·is the market price,. 
In tlle balancing of risks against growth potentials for any future 
illustrations_. decisions regarding ltb!ll! 'will ·have to be arbitrarily made; . 
but the investor must never lose sight of the fact that .these are separate 
and difficult decisions, and the success or failure of hia total investment 
program bangs in the balance .• 
In Chapter Two, the investor vas directed to establish roughly a 
dollars and cents estimate for future earnings. As was emphasized in the 
introductory paragraphs of this section, integral with tbta estimate, a 
more or less d.efinite time limit must be established for materialization 
of these earnings. The results of any risk estimations must be introduced 
as countervailing forces to make this growth estimate more realistic. both 
in numbers of dollars to be realized as profit and the amount of time 
necessary for realization. 
Several noteworthy events in history dramatize how extremely deluded 
and unrealistic investors will allow themselvea to become-uben visions of 
extraordinarily large and quick pecuniary profits dance in their heads. 
These dramas. which are slightly aside from the central theme of this 
paper, are submitted here as facing the investor with the real crux of the 
value-balancing problem. The nature of the task is pointed out by showing 
how unbalanced growth and risk can become in the minds of investors. 
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Two situatione from the eighteenth century, "l'he South Sea Bubble" 
and ''The Kissiesippi Scheme," clearly show how entire nations can be over-
come by the allure o~ quick profits~ .The Mississippi Scheme was contrived 
by an Englishman, John Lav. as a cure for the huge national debt with 
which Prance was saddled, due to the extravagance of Louts XIV. Law bad 
such success initially vith eraain~ France's deficit (partially through the 
use of fully backed paper currency) that the king allowed Law'• Klasissippi 
Company exclusive rights to trade in the Mississippi area of the Hew World. 
?he kiruz: also allowed the Roval ·Bank and taw~ s company ~o become one be~ 
cause of Law's successes, coupled vith the king's apathy t;owards "routine" 
problems. Lav and the king were, therefore, jointly liable for the final 
collapse of this venture. Speculation in the stock of the Mtaaissippi 
Company reached unbelievable proportions due to the fact that "Law's 
promises had become fact .. " Collapse came when a fev more realistic and 
discerning men recognized that all relationships had been destroyed between 
value and market price, making their fiat money virtually worthless, and 
asked for specie in exchange . 
the South Sea Company Bubble was a similar scheme devised by Harley, 
Earl of Oxford, to aid England in eliminating a national debt and restoring 
public credit in the early 1700's. Exclusive trading rights to the com-
pany were granted ln the South Sus. The South Sea Company also super-
seded the Bank of England as the pilot behind the public credit after a 
running competition before the House of Cannons. The publicity of tbia 
battle made the demands for stock of the South Sea Company almost frantic, 
and the price went out of reason. The fervor caused many spurioua stocks 
23 
and frauds to be pe~etrated on the public. Ensuing public indignation 
and investigation made market prices collapse, causing long-lasting 
misery. 1 
However, these debacles are not reatricted to other centuries or 
countries. In the 1920'a, the people of America engineered, through 
avarice, an unprecedented land .boom in Florida. "It vas a 1920'• boom 
practice for sellers to accept as little as a tenth of the sale price--
or even the buyer's note--aa down payment on property. M. A. Hortt, veteran 
Port Lauderdale real-estate broker, tells of aome scrub-pine land he bought 
in 1911 for $3,200. He sold it for $58,000 in 1924, then bought it back 
a fev days later for $116,000. In May, 1925, he sold the property again, 
for $282,000. Thirteen days later it went for $640,000. In another three 
months and -five days it brought $800,000. Finally, a couple of months 
after that, it sold for $1,500,000. As all those sales turned out to have 
been mainly on paper, hOwever, the land eventually reverted to Hortt •••• "2 
The Crash of 1929 vividly points out the fact that unrealiatic 
value judgment can reach fever pitch in the stock market. 0 Since it was 
important, the question inevitably arises whether a similar cycle of specu-
lation and collapse could again occur. The simple answer is, "Of Course"! 
Laws have been passed to outlaw some of the more egregious behavior which 
lCharles MacICay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions !!m! ~ Madness g! 
Crowd!• L. C. Page and Co., a subsidiary of Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, Inc. 
(1932). See this reference for detailed reading on the Mississippi Scheme 
and the South Sea Bubble. 
21.. Jaruuan, "Nev Styles in Florida Land Booms," Saturday Eycm1ng 
Post (February 18, 1956), p. 104. 
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· contribut.ed to the big bull market of the twenties., Nothing has been done 
about seminal lunacy which possesses people who see a chance of becoming 
rich. On the assumption that history .does not repeat itself precisely~ 
ve may never again see the particular lunacy of the late twenties~ But 
if we survive to suffer such things, w can undoubtedly count 011 some 
variation. The time to worry will be when important. people begin to ex-
plain that it cannot happen because conditions are fundamentally sound."1 
One further debacle is quickly cited because it poignantly· shows 
the ludicrousness of these avaricious delusions. The tulip became a 
status symbol in the late 1500's and early 1600's in western Europe-~ 
especially Bolland and Germany. The prices reached auch peaka that entire 
fortunes passed hands merely for a new variety. A nev measure of weight 
had to be developed (peritie) since roots were so light. Shortly. the 
number of bulbs increased to the point that demand abated aud value was 
reflected upon and prices fell catastrophically. Hundreda of fortunes 
were Wiped out due to 11Tulipmania."2 
These incidents from the past make the importance of careful value 
balancing clear. Ae a part of the history of man, they make it imperative 
that an inves.tor weigh risks and growth potential carefully to avoid 
repetition of these debacles. These debacles occur vhen reason and analysis 
go out the window and the false idea enters that extraordinary returns do 
not always require the assumption of proportional risks. For each point 
1
.John Kenneth Gelbraith. ''The Great Wall Street Crash," Harper's 
Magazine (October, 1954). pp. 71-80. 
2ifac1tay, op. cit. 
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that the investor sees in the economy and the corporation indicating growth, 
there will be factors working against this growth prospect. He must weigh 
carefully to judge how sure growth really is .• 
To avoid becoming .a part of even a microscopic debacle, as growth 
delusions in one particula~ issue Dlight be considered, the investor should 
compare bis judginent of the balance of risk& and return potentials against 
another evaluation or standard. Does such a yardstick exist? In com-
petitive bidding for the limited number of securities offered, investors 
are pitting their evaluation.a of growth and risk potential against one 
another. It follows that the market price at any point in time ia the 
embodiment of the various judpents of the investment opportunity at the 
same time. The relationship of the market price to the earnings at this 
time is significant.1 "The price/earnings ratio, or its reciprocal, the 
earni~s/prlce rate, is one of the fundamental yardsticks utilized by in-
veators in the evaluation of the market prices in general and the price 
of individual stocks in particular." 
Examination of a sample of listed securities will usually reveal a 
wide range in price/earnings ratios, giving wide eamings/price percentage 
rates. This is manifestation of the excitement or despair that imrestors 
feel over prospects for various companies. 
After the investor baa examined the current price earnings ratio 
for the security in which he is interested, he decides whether his 
1
sanford L. Margoshes, "Price/Earnings Ratio in Pinancial Analysis--
Its Uses and Abuses," Financial Analysts Journal (November-December, 1960); 
Bcnjainin Graham and David Dodd, Security .Analysis, McGraw-Bill Book Co., 
Inc., New York (1951). 
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estimation coincides with this multiple or not. Re should also decide 
whetlier or no.t this nultiple is realistic. Thie must concern him because 
this multiple reflects the market price> dictating whether the investment 
·will be profitable or not; and this is really the proof of whether or 
not a value was obtained. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
WAT BATE OP RETURN? 
Involved mathematical calculations and comparisons are usually 
resorted to for objectivity and precision in measuring the value of the 
growth prospects for a security. Almost every current article covering 
this area makes use of involved and frequently obtuse calculations; and 
voluminous findings are charted and/or tabled to document the text. Some 
authors even ·go so far as to develop formidable and often monumental 
formulas into which the several 'factors purported as critical can be in• 
serted by an investor; from these. mechanistically. the optimum market 
price to pay for a certain growth rate can be ejected} !ut, in each 
article it is. clear that the factors to be inserted and the basic premise 
come from value judgment on the investor's part. Specifically, he abays 
has to decide the amount of and the race of growth at which earnings 
travel· and, also, his desired rate of return. 
In this chapter the basic principles behind almost any penetrating 
mathematical experiment for stock analysis will be discussed to point up 
the desired results. Although it is herein felt that these mathematical 
approaches attempt to formulize an area that is much too emotional and 
qualitative to formulize, the discipline of the mathematical approach 
does more clearly sbov the investor wat factors are critical in deciding 
whether the market price for a stock is too high to obtain hia.deaired 
return. 
1ltobert Ferguson, "A Monograph for Valuing Growth Stocks," 
Financial Analysts Journal (May-June, 1961), p. 29. 
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Making the decision with regard to desired return on invested 
funds, as ws noted in the introduction. is elemental to any investment 
policy. An investor who is considering growth stocks should now see that 
he must eet an aggressively high return goal. The reasoning here le 
straightforward and will be dealt with quickly, simply as a link in a logi-
cal chain. 
Aziomatically. it should be restated that an investor only assumes 
risks because he envisions conmenaurate returns. If riskless investment 
existed, it would mean that invested funds would not lose any purchasing 
power, and they could be retrieved intact at will. It la not likely that 
such an investment would deliver a handsome return; yet many existing 
investment opportunities have minimal risks and coincidently yield a return 
for invested funds compounded at growth rates equal or greater than that 
of the gross national product. Many of these situations allow funde to 
be withdrawn with short periods of notice••or even at demand! Bxcellent 
examples of this exist in the form of government bonds, bills, aod notes. 
These examples are significant because United Statea government obliga-
tiona are the bulwark of value in the United States. Vith fiat money 
and government guarantees so prevalent in this country, nearly the total 
faith and credit of the American people lies in government guarantees, 
control, and coinage. Therefore, if the .standard of good credit bas to 
pay 1\-3\ percent for money to use for relatively short periods of ti111e, 
a floor under return appears to form. Further, an investor can receive 
3 percent--computed on a daily basis in the savings departments of many 
coumercial banka. For coumitments of one year, banks are allowed to pay 
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up to 4 percent • . Rotbing ,needa to. be ·said defending. the safety of deposits 
in these institutions. Many savings and loan aasociations .will pay· 4 
percent for a ; conmf.ttal of one calendar quarter!' In both ..,f these situ• 
ationa; funda are guaranteedsafe ·up to certain statutory limita by the 
United States government and are retrievable virtually upon demand ~ there• 
fore. an ·investor could consider 4 percent a minimal return. Yet. following 
tbia bend of thought further~ if the stature of the debt imtrumenta of " 
some of the largest United States c~q>0rationa are dispassionately examined, 
their credit standing vill rank close. to that of the United States .govern• 
ment. If this statement is accepted as true, the rates paid on the 
corporation .bonds would push the floor of minimum acceptable inveatment 
return up to 5 percent, still assuming a very lov risk level. It 1hould 
alao be noted that very little investigation or management is required 
by the inveator to maintain his investment and 1ta return safe in these 
situations .. 
So far only debt instrument• have been mentioned. In a recent 
issue of an important financial magazine, a list was given of atocka listed 
1 
on the Nev York Stock Exchange vhich still yield S-6 percent or greater. 
'Even the aligbteat acquaintance with the qualifications of a corporation 
before it may be listed on the "big board" will convince an investor that 
investment stature is represented in moat of these stoclcs. It must be 
recogniaed that these stocks are not growth atocka (as defined herein), 
and, moreover, as bas already been pointed out, the average big ~rd 
stock pays only· 2.9 percent. Yet, the investor must nov see that if he 
1
"Higb Yielding Big Board Stocks," Forbes (September lS, 1961), 
P• 47. 
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ia going to assume gTeater risks than the above illustrations represent 
and ia going to look to the future for his return. he must demand a suf• 
ficiently high one. Haw tm.lch he should demand ia up to the individual 
because be must decide the degree of risk be is willing to assume, and 
the return he feels this assumption merits. For illustration purposes 
in the example co be given, 8 percent: will be W.ed, but 11lU8C not be 
interpreted as a recoamendation or suggestion of what should be expected. 
The problem that still faces the investor is deciding if the return be 
may expect from an investment in a particular grcarth stock is currently 
over-priced. 
The percentage rate referred to in Chapter Three as earnings/price 
rate will repruent the rate of return an investor may expect under limited 
circumstances only. These would be (1) if there la no change in earnings 
over the period of time he will hold the investment; (2) if the earnings/ 
price rate will remain constant for the same period; and (3) if declared 
dividenda Vill equal reported earnings. A stock with these outstanding 
qualities vould closely resemble an intereat•bearing bond .and consequently 
lend itself to a yield to maturity calculation.1 However, the investor 
knows by this stage in his examinations that the above factors vill not 
remain constant and such a yie :'d calculation will be ephemeral in nature 
at best. 
One tool that any basic finance text will incorporate for aiding 
bond•yield studies is noted. This aid 1a known aa a chart of present 
ly1eld to maturity is the rate of return calculated by dividing 
the total income received from an investment, plus the increments of 
appreciation mi.Du• the loss through amortization, by the original coat 
of the investment. 
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value.1 It shows in tabular form the preaent value for the repayment of 
$1 at various future times and rates of return. Por growth stock coo• 
sideration, though, this is not directly applicable because there are 1DOre 
variable elements in the nature of stocks than there are in bonds. llov-
ever, it does ahov the nature of the quantity that should be sought. 
In almost any coamon stock investment, at least part of an in-
vestor's return vill be in dividends. As stated earlier, a large segment 
of the investing public puta heavy emphaaia on the amount of and tbe rate 
of payment for dividends. (This explains why management's attitude toward 
this policy waa stressed in Chapter Three.) Therefore, the payout of 
dividends must be considered in any calculation for yield on a cOlllDOD 
stock investment. ~ methods for arriving at this factor are offered: 
(1) a study of the percentage payout of earnings; and (2) a study of per-
centage payout of cash flow. Baaing his judgmenta on history and future 
predictions, the investor baa been directed to forecast the rates and 
amounts of growth for both methoda; after this, be may elect either one. 
Both methods are defendable atnce the relationabip of dividends to the 
one chosen la what is really significant. 
The earning• of a company should be looked upon as a stream running 
continuously from origin into infinity. The inveator has aheady examined 
the past and present earnings of this company. Be baa also examined the 
growth prospects for a definite future period. From these, he baa decided 
the average annual growth rate for the future. He bas examined the rieke 
1
"Present Value," Financial Handbook, Ronald Presa Co. (1957), 
p. 1186. 
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of thi• •tock end of competitive atocka and baa decided that 8 percent 
la the mininun return that be vill accept. He baa estimated what part 
of tbeae earnings be will receive aa ammal dividend•. Be baa observed 
what the current market price ••a hill to pay for the privilege of in-
veatlog••i• thie acceptable? Aaaume that the lnveator feel• (for a certain 
company) that be can aafely estimate eaminp for flve yeara. He thloka 
that earning• will compound at 20 percent annually and that the company 
vlll contf.DUOU91y be able to grant a SO percent payout in earnings: 
YEARS 
EABHINGS 
PIVI.D!NDS 
(All amount• ehoun •• !119\lnte per ahar1) 
1 2 3 4 
$1.00 $1.20 $1.44 $1.73 
$ .so $ .60 $ .72 $ .86 
s 
$2.08 
$1.04 
If tbe investor refera to a preaenc value chart and computes tbe 
value of the above dividend•• the following figure• vlll ariae: 
YBAll 
PB.ESEN'r VALUE 
or DIVIDENDS 
1 
$.46 
2 
$.51 
3 
$.57 
4 
$.63 
5 
$.71 
Bovewr, dividends are not the total nature of return, eapecially 
for growth stock.a. An estimate of the market price for the atock in tbe 
terminal year i• neceaeary. Since tbo investor feet. that hi• fuaa llU8t 
obtain an 8 percent return, be vill estimate thia return for his •tock 
in the terminal year. Comequently, be would estlmate hi• atock •• aelliog 
at 12% time• tbe terminal year'• earnings. or $21.32. Thia amount re-
turned in the fifth year would have a present value of $14.52. The total 
present value of thi• inveatment would be the asgregate of the present 
value of the dividend•• and a tock•• terminal aarket prlce••<f .46 + $.Sl + 
$.57 + $.63 + $.71 + $14.52) or $17.40. the 1mreetor abould not pay any 
.,re than $17.40 today for this •tock. Th1• calculation aay be perfomecl 
for any situation by merely changing the elements. If the valuea are 
correctly assumed. the result will be realistic. 
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In summary, an investor should be certain that he is entering a 
transaction that will give him the return he feels the situation merits 
in light of foreseen risks and the competitive situation. By using such 
computations as above, he can determine this; and by inserting various 
figures, he can determine mathematically the possibility of paying too 
much for future growth? He can also prove that the current price/ 
earnings ratio is evidence that other investors either know facts that be 
does not or that they are deluded with regard to growth potential. 
CHAPTER. PIVE 
WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO SAY to THB GROW'rll STOCK INVBSTOll'l 
Thia paper has attempted to determine whether growth stocks are 
fact or fantasy. There is no categorical or absolute ansver to this in• 
quiry. At this stage. however, there should be little question l:'egarding 
the character of growth stocks. their existence and attractiveness. The 
question. "Fact or fantasy?" must be anawered individually with regard 
to the price an investol:' pays for the privilege of ownership. As a two• 
pronged offering toward (1) the question posed by the title of the paper 
and (2) aumnariziug the preceding chapters, several thoughts on a philosophy 
for growth stock investors will be submitted. 
The investor must become a fact gatherer. The more he knova about 
the economy, industry, scientific advancements, social trends, nev products, 
and individual companies, the larger becomes bis universe from which to 
pick investment candidates. Consequently. the more be knove about each 
individual situation, the better his chances are of having a portfolio 
of some of the best real growth values currently available. 
The more facts an investor baa, the more incisive and penetrating 
his analysis must be. This is true because (1) the nature of a real 
growth situation is complex and transitory; (2) funds are usually limited, 
but once comnitted, may be bard to retrieve, aod (3) the~ to invest 
in a real growth stock is !!el!! An investor must be able to separate 
quickly. yet correctly, the chaff from the good k.ernela in order to buy 
while the market price makes the investment opportunity a value opportunity. 
JS 
The object of growth •tock inveating i• to participate in future large 
e.aruinga; therefore, any delay iu making coamitment aitiptea poaaible 
profita. Thi• point• up vhy elaborate mathematical coaputatiou cau be 
more costly (due to ti- ueeded) tbau helpful. 
Therefore, the lnveator miat not ouly be a fact-gatherer; he 1mat 
alao be a rapid aifter of facta. Since a dlacount of theae future earuinga 
la built into the current market price of growth iaauea, the alfting 
operation of the inveator muat be accurate aud perceptive. Be muat alao 
remain aenaitive to the rumora of the amrket place, alnce aoy indlcatiou 
of doubt in the mind• of the inveatlns public regarding the total mnet, 
or especially regardins a particulal' iaaue 18 an omen of clanger. 
The moat disaatrou• elemeuta of l'iak 11lhereut iu growth atocka lie 
iu au abl'Upt reversal of a glmloroua growth rate, or in the failure of a 
forecaated growth rate to occur. Aa noted earlier, the flc1de inveatlng 
public quickly becomea 4iaencbanted vith an laaue vhen ita future growth 
proapecta appear threatened or the current •rket price appear• to over-
diacount future growth. 
Therefore, the inveator aJat remain eenaltive to the -rket, aod 
-.u1t conatantly re-evaluate tba ccnporate aituatiou and hia personal 
market poaltioa. Thia re-evaluation muat be couducted la order to aaaure 
that hi• investment nmaina at the ..... value level aa when he purcbaaed 
it. He 1mat also decide vbetber be agreea, after hie atudiea, vitb the 
ru.>r• in the market place and whether or not the complexioa of the altu-
ation baa changed •t1tedly enough to require changing bia podtlou 1u 
the aecurity. 
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The investor must constantly consider both the facts and the rumors 
of the market place. Bowcver:. . he must not allow auch knowledge of tech• 
nical information regarding the market price, the economy, or the company 
concerned to destroy bis self-confidence. There alvnys have been and 
always will be p1:0pheta of doom who say that a crash ia coming or tba~ the 
arket as a whole or an issue in particular le over-priced. The investor 
cannot allow either these rumors or this technical information to deter 
him from a thorough objective examination of the facts. nor to destroy 
hie confidence in his own ability to decide what the facts really 84y. 
This is mandatory because in the final analysis the deciai~n11 (key) vhich 
determine success or failure of an investment program, especially growth 
stocks, lie within the investor himself. 
In aUJllll8ry;the investor should see that he is compelled to iuveatl 
by aggressive forces attacking the store of value ln his money. He sees 
that true growth stocks are really FA~ and that they offer outstanding 
opportunities for rewarding investment. At the same time, he aeoa that 
he must personally bear the burden of minimiir:ing inherent risk• by sound 
value judgments in order to maximize future proflta. If he doea not, 
h11 growth stocks may become FANTASY and be no more to him than a tulip 
bulb wa to many Dutchmen at the end of the fever known as Tulipmania. 
11t must be reiterated that this clearly cannot be interpreted aa 
advocating compulsive investing v.lthout the analysis recounended in the 
paper. It is far better to hold cash than an unsound investment. But, 
the purchasing power of the dollars 1m.1at be protected. 
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